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«strategic epistemology».
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Було розглянуто питання кореляції традиції філософських досліджень Франції наприкінці XIX ст. – першій по-
ловині XX ст. з особливостями створення та реалізації національних воєнних доктрин, які виступали основними пла-
нами підготовки Франції до обох світових воєн. Проведено паралелі між інтуїтивізмом Бергсона, раціоналізм Декарта 
та планами французького головного командування, які під час світових воєн XX століття зазнали поразки. Зроблено 
висновок про те, що дані кореляції не мають суттєвого персонального характеру; більш фундаментальні впливи на 
стратегічну культуру треба шукати в способах пізнання, які є основними для філософії за весь час її історії, що перед-
бачається в дисципліні «стратегічна епістемологія»
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Был рассмотрен вопрос о корреляции традиции философских исследований Франции в конце XIX в. – первой 
половины XX в. С особенностями создания и реализации национальных военных доктрин, которые являлись основ-
ными планами подготовки Франции к обеим мировым войнам. Были проведены параллели между интуитивизмом 
Бергсона, рационализмом Декарта и планами французского верховного командования, которые во время мировых войн 
XX в. потерпели поражение. Был сделан вывод о том, что данные корреляции не имеют существенного персонального 
характера; более фундаментальные влияния на стратегическую культуру надо искать в способах познания, которые 
являются основными для философии за все время ее истории, что предполагается в дисциплине «стратегическая эпи-
стемология».
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American military historian Lee Kennett in his re-
search on declassified documents of the «N» series of 
the French military archives, related to the American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF), came to conclusion about 
difference in worldviews of American and French offic-
ers during the First World War: «French observers nev-
er tired of analyzing the American military mind and 
its strange approach to problems: «If they often make 
rapid and important decisions, these decisions, insuffi-
ciently studied, are frequently and profoundly modified 
in the execution.» Or again: «The harmony of the plan 
originally proposed is destroyed. Such as it is, the ac-
tion taken is an original one - an American one.» Such 
pragmatism seems perfectly comprehensible to us, even 
laudable in its flexibility. But, to the Cartesian minds 
that tried to understand it, it was alien and baffling. So 
it remained throughout the war» [30, p. 4]. Lee Kennett 
is not alone in such evaluation. Robert Allan Doughty, 
US brigadier general (retired), military historian, writes: 
«Hundreds of officers in key positions willingly sup-
ported the doctrine and never complained that the 
French concepts required further change. The doctrine 
they constructed was a masterpiece of Cartesian logic 
and bureaucratic compromise. Almost no one doubted 
the annihilating effects of firepower, and few questioned 
the necessity of the methodical battle for controlling the 
delivery of this firepower» [16, p. 187]. Eugenia Kies-
ling, professor of military history of American military 
academy at West-Point described argumentation of the 
French vice-admiral R.Castex in the following way: 
«The analysis of the word «strategy» is quite conven-
tional in its outcome, but the lengthy discussion allows 
Castex to demonstrate his tedious penchants for odd 
metaphors and half-baked Cartesian philosophy» [31, p. 
122; 33].
At the same time, the disadvantages of training of 
American servicemen were dubbed as «Cartesian» as 
well: «The US Army, arriving on the field of battle un-
prepared for large-scale war, followed the French mili-
tary approach to education based on the philosophy of 
Rene Descartes. Descartes was a famous mathematician 
who broke down engineering problems in sequence, 
making it easier to teach formulas to engineering stu-
dents. This approach was translated into French military 
training, where the French found it easy to break down 
military problem solving into processes (checklists) to 
educate their officers and their awaiting masses of citi-
zen soldiers upon mobilization […] The Cartesian ap-
proach allowed the French (and later the United States) 
to easily teach a common, fundamental doctrinal lan-
guage to many who were new to the military. It signifi-
cantly reduced the time it took to master basic military 
skills. The downfall of this approach is that it simpli-
fies war (complex problems) into processes where the 
enemy is only a template, not a free-thinking adversary 
with a very important voice in determining how the 
plan might be executed. The Cartesian approach also 
slows down a decision cycle by turning the planners’ 
focus inward on process instead of outward on the en-
emy. The problem with this approach is that it does not 
fit in with the problem at hand» [56, p. 145].
How to understand these assessments? Are they 
mere clichés, or they are attempts to find these who are 
guilty of the national strategic errors; or they are not the 
accidental metaphors, but adequate reflection of the es-
sence of the French strategic culture of the end of XIX 
– the first half of the XX centuries? Is this issue limited 
by the name of R. Descartes only?
It seems possible to find the answers to these ques-
tions if:
- To analyze historical evidence of direct influence 
of dominating philosophic doctrines on the French pro-
fessional military education of the mentioned period of 
time; to disclose personal adoption of particular philo-
sophic views by the members of the French supreme 
command;
- To look for semantic correlations between meth-
odologies of cognition of the most significant philo-
sophic schools and peculiarities of elaboration of na-
tional military doctrines and strategic decision-making. 
The end of XIX – first half of XX century in 
France is a time of active interaction of the French 
writers, philosophers, sociologists, jurists, historians, 
psychologists (or «clercs» – intellectuals (J.Benda [4, 
p. XXIX]), «hommes de lettres» - Émile Boutroux, Ha-
notaux, Lavisse, comte de Mun, Maurice Barrès, Henri 
Lavedan, Lévy-Bruhl, Joseph Bédier, Aulard, Vic-
tor Basch (R. Poincaré [47, p. 227])) with institutes of 
French professional military education and intellectual 
elite of the French armed forces. Journalist H.Bidou 
even linked the victory on Marne with embodiment 
of the French national spirit, by the analogy with 
Descartes «Meditations» and Pascal’s «Pensées» [8, p. 
230]. European history contains many names of civil 
intellectuals connected with friendship and professional 
liaisons with military officers, but according to histori-
cal evidence, just in France in the mentioned period this 
interaction became systematic and developed. 
Thus, this situation was not entirely new in the in-
tellectual history of France. According to Azar Gat, the 
historian of the Western military thought, it is possible 
to find traces of Cartesian rationalism in military theo-
ries of Enlightenment [23, р. 28]. Amongst other refer-
ences, the following points could be noticed: 
- bringing axiomatics into military theory [50, pp. 
48, 146, 161; 41, pp. 63, 81, 96 etc];
- referring to Descartes as a founder of rationalis-
tic scientific method in debates about scientific status 
of military theory [41, pp. XV, XVIII; 18, p. XXX-
XXXI] etc. According to official documents, starting 
at least from the second half of the XIX century in the 
special military school Saint-Cyr the philosophic works 
of B.Pascal and R.Descartes were compulsory for study 
for the officers of the French army [34, p. 61]. General 
courses in philosophy were the part of the French high-
er military education [28, 29, 33].
Having this deep tradition of incorporation of phi-
losophy into military theory and education, there is no 
surprise that in the pre-First World War time philosophy 
played significant role in the French intellectual fashion 
which, as it will be attempted to show further, could be 
considered as correlating or even possibly influential for 
76 	 «Грані».	2017.	Том	20;	1(141)www.grani.org.ua
   ГРАНІISSN 2077-1800 (Print), ISSN 2413-8738 (Online)
the French supreme command before the First World 
War, in war-time and interwar period.
Historians traditionally refer to Henri Bergson 
as a leader of the pre-war French intellectual fashion. 
Being opposed to positivism, Bergson declared prior-
ity of intuition in epistemology [11, p. 315] and «vital 
burst» as a central concept of his philosophy of life. 
These metaphysical features are usually linked with the 
French pre-war strategic doctrine: «The publication of 
Bergson’s book Creative Evolution (1907) enhanced 
Bergson’s popularity in France. In his theory of «Crea-
tive Evolution» a single spiritual force, the élan vital - 
vital impulse-constitutes ultimate reality. To grasp one’s 
impulse pure intellect is left behind: «You must take 
things by storm; you must thrust intelligence outside it-
self by act of will.» Action, instinct, will, and force, all 
take precedence over reason. This concept of the élan 
vital appealed not only to intellectuals, students, and 
romantics like Peguy (who died in the first few weeks 
of World War I), but it also helped create a cult of the 
offensive in the French military and society. A member 
of the French Chamber of Deputies declared, «The idea 
of the offensive must penetrate the spirit of the nation.» 
Marshal Foch also spoke of «the decisive power of of-
fensive action undertaken with resolute determination to 
march on the enemy, reach, and destroy him.» [55]. 
As a rule, historians operate the notion of philoso-
phy as a source of ideas and doctrines, which can be 
more or less influential on political and military deci-
sion-makers: «By emphasizing élan vital (vital urge), 
intuition, and metaphysics, he was part of the Europe-
an-wide rebellion against the narrow rationalism and 
materialism of nineteenth century positivism […] Berg-
son’s élan vital fit right into French military thinking, 
which stressed offensive tactics, as taught at the École 
de Guerre in the period before World War I. Such think-
ing held that colorful uniforms, martial music, and the 
«will to conquer» would overcome any materiel short-
comings» [26, p. 201]. The clarity and simplicity of 
the scheme «élan vital – French offensive doctrine» 
(another reason of emerging of this scheme were dip-
lomatic missions of Bergson [2, 3, 6, 51]) remain quite 
tempting for historians: it allows to establish easily cor-
relative/causal links between two phenomena – popular 
philosophy and military doctrine avoiding immersing 
to more deep analysis of more essential analysis of this 
relation: «Living in the shadow of that unfinished busi-
ness, France, reviving in spirit and strength, grew weary 
of being eternally on guard, eternally exhorted by her 
leaders to defend herself. As the century turned, her 
spirit rebelled against thirty years of the defensive with 
its implied avowal of inferiority. France knew herself 
to be physically weaker than Germany. Her population 
was less, her birth rate lower. She needed some weap-
on• that Germany lacked to give herself confidence in 
her survival. The «idea with a sword» fulfilled the need. 
Expressed by Bergson it was called élan vital, the all-
conquering will. Belief in its power convinced France 
that the human spirit need not, after all, bow to the 
predestined forces of evolution which Schopenhauer 
and Hegel had declared to be irresistible. The spirit of 
France would be the equalizing factor. Her will to win, 
her élan, would enable France to defeat her enemy. Her 
genius was in her spirit. The spirit of la gloire, of 1792, 
of the incomparable «Marseillaise,» the spirit of Gen-
eral Margueritte’s heroic cavalry charge before Sedan 
when even Wilhelm, watching the battle, could not for-
bear to cry, «Oh, les braves gens!» [53, p. 48].
It is hard to blame historians in this surface under-
standing of Bergson’s role in the forming of pre-war in-
tellectual trends of the French officers. Bergson in his 
lectures, which were attended by the French officers, 
in his open letters and articles conceptualized the gen-
eral meaning of the war: «Writing in November 1914 
in an article intended for front-line troops, Bergson 
defined the war as a conflict of diametrically opposed 
philosophical principles. On the one hand, Germany 
represented «mechanism,» or the systematic divinisa-
tion of material power; on the other, the Entente pow-
ers represented the moral authority of civilized people 
who recognized that material force had to be governed 
by moral law. Bergson, arguing passionately that moral 
authority would outlast material might, attempted to re-
assure the troops of the French Army that their cause 
would prevail. To this end, he distinguished between 
the «force that exhausts itself» and the force that does 
not. Material force, however formidable in appearance, 
was nonrenewable; built upon finite resources, its do-
minion would likewise prove finite. But the force that 
comes from moral conviction and principle sustains it-
self; immaterial, it is also inexhaustible. He urged the 
French troops to take heart, for «while the force which 
nourishes itself only on its own brutality» would wear 
itself out in time, the force that sustained the French 
Army would «renew itself» over and over again.» [27, 
p. 189; see also 7, pp. 43-47]. 
Documental evidence of the interest of French 
generals in Bergson’s philosophy is significant: Mau-
rice Gamelin «was a flexible and thoughtful profes-
sional, a cultured man who had made a serious study of 
art, history and Bergsonian philosophy.» [1, p. 30; see 
also 19, pp. 283-284; 21, p. XVIII]; Charles de Gaulle 
«had read all the books of Bergson when he was writ-
ing his «La France et son Armée»» [12, p. 97; see also 
14, p. 228; 15, p. 151; 35, pp. 237-245]; Joseph Joffre 
«had Bergsonian escort» [20, p. 223; 25, p. 294]. The 
notion of élan vital is traditionally linked with offen-
sive strategy of France (Plan XVII [17, pp. 501-507]), 
rooted in military education and realized in concrete 
decisions during the First World War: «The doctrine of 
the offensive had its fount in the Ecole Supérieure de 
la Guerre, or War College, the ark of the army’s intel-
lectual elite, whose director, General Ferdinand Foch, 
was the molder of French military theory of his time. 
Foch’s mind, like a heart, contained two values: one 
pumped spirit into strategy; the other circulated com-
mon sense. On the one hand Foch preached a mystique 
of will expressed in his famous aphorisms, «The will to 
conquer is the first condition of victory,» or more suc-
cinctly, «Victoire c’est la volonté,» and, «A battle won 
is a battle in which one will not confess oneself beat-
en.» In practice this was to become the famous order 
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at the Marne to attack when the situation called for re-
treat. His officers of those days remember him bellow-
ing «Attack! Attack!» with furious, sweeping gestures 
while he dashed about in short rushes as if charged by 
an electric battery. Why, he was later asked, did be ad-
vance at the Marne when he was technically beaten? 
«Why? I don’t know. Because of my men, because I 
had a will. And then - God was there.» [53, p. 49].
Abundance of documental evidence helped to 
leave behind chances to uncover deeper relations be-
tween Bergson’s philosophy and contemporary French 
military theory. As well, the way to the oblivion of less 
surface historical inquiry was simplified by the com-
mon stereotype of philosophy as a source of ideas. Ef-
ficiency of methods (instead of ideas) of philosophic 
cognition, which can be more powerful and influential 
than any personal contacts or intellectual fashion is way 
worse subject of analysis: there is no chance to draw a 
plausible causal scheme. But, in more successful case, 
the fundamentality of results after wide debates could 
launch new discipline in war studies – strategic episte-
mology.
E.A.Cohen and J.Gooch articulated (or, to say 
more radically – invented, at least for contemporary 
readers) the statement, which looks obvious but, enig-
matically, remains formally ignored: «Military organi-
zations should inculcate in their members a relentless 
empiricism, a disdain for a priori theorizing if they are 
to succeed» [13, p. 236]. Debate that lasted for almost 
three centuries between rationalists and empiricists was 
solved by only one sentence in the research devoted to 
military failures. Amongst the contradictory, debatable, 
oversophisticated historical schemes about causality in 
military history the classical philosophic opposition «a 
posteriori – a priori may» look too arguable, as all the 
cornerstones.
If to use broad analogy, the empirical way of cog-
nition can be compared with military intelligence, no 
matter to which level of planning it refers – to tactical, 
operational, or strategic level. In theory, military intelli-
gence supposed to be characterized as doing scrupulous 
analysis of the facts, modest generalizations, and tough 
verifying every elementary hypothesis aimed to get the 
truth about real facts. These functions of intelligence 
service can be neglected buy a supreme command, 
which can essentially increase chances of defeat.
In the case of the French plan XVII and its failure, 
it is possible to conclude that it was not realistic at all. 
Systematic failure of the French strategic intelligence 
played essential role in the strategic blunders of the ini-
tial phase of war: «The real failure of 1914, however, 
was that of intelligence. French intelligence failed to 
predict the great sweep of the Schlieffen Plan. This was 
in part because the Germans had changed their codes 
just prior to the war, blinding the French at the very 
moment when they needed the information. However, 
unless the evidence presented by intelligence had been 
overwhelming, Joffre probably could not have been 
persuaded to abandon Plan XVII. French intelligence 
realized only belatedly that the Germans had placed 
reservists in the front lines in 1914, thus swelling the 
numbers of troops available for the flanking maneuver 
through Belgium. Once the war had settled down into 
a trench deadlock, it became easier to anticipate en-
emy action. The massing of troops in advance of an of-
fensive could be picked out by air reconnaissance and 
aerial photography. French cryptography and commu-
nications intelligence also improved. On the Somme in 
the summer of 1916, the liaison between the Deuxieme 
Bureau (intelligence) and the artillery was perfected 
to the point that some captured Germans believed that 
they had been betrayed.» In 1917, Petain placed intel-
ligence and operations under the same chief so as to 
better coordinate them. The Deuxieme Bureau predicted 
the date and place of the German offensive of March 
21, 1918, although they also believed Champagne to 
be menaced, causing Petain to hold back troops to de-
fend that front. The greatest intelligence lapse of the 
trench war was the failure to predict the German of-
fensive on the Chemin des Dames on May 27, 1918, an 
attack which almost broke the French front wide open. 
However, Foch’s judicious use of intelligence allowed 
him to make more audacious attacks in the summer of 
1918.» [48, p. 213]. Offensive character of the French 
strategy helped to disregard the data provide by intel-
ligence service: «Although Joffre went to great pains in 
his memoirs to point out that Plan XVII contained an 
elaborate «Intelligence Plan» which demanded detailed 
information on German military movements on the 
outbreak of hostilities, there is no indication that he al-
lowed German actions to interfere in any way with his 
scheme. After all, why should attacking generals worry 
overmuch about the intentions of an enemy condemned 
merely to parry the thrusts of an aggressive opponent?» 
[49, p. 63]. 
Bergson’s idea of «élan vital» was not the sole 
point of correlation of the philosophic fashion and the 
French offensive strategy. His teaching about intuition 
as the fundamental way of cognition correlates with the 
non-realistic Plan XVII and the blunders of the French 
strategic intelligence in the pre-war period. H. Bergson 
received heavy criticism from J.Benda [5, 25, 43, 44] 
and J. de Pierrefeu («Before 1914 France possessed a 
General Staff worthy to be called Bergsonian. Its doc-
trine accepted the discredit of intelligence and favoured 
the cult of intuition. This is a statement which is stupe-
fying and incredible: at first sight it is positively stag-
gering. But after due examination it emerges as a per-
fectly truthful assertion. And this General Staff of ours 
forced its conviction to the ultimate limits. It went far 
beyond Bergson himself, who would never have dared 
to admit that intuition was possessed of a power mar-
velous enough to prepare a revenge for 1870: Bergson 
would at least have invited intelligence to collaborate in 
that difficult task. You would hardly believe it, but our 
Joffre, so comfortably established as a physical entity, 
and so completely attached, by good health and a good 
appetite, to the world of solid things which the Berg-
sonian professes to despise, identified himself with 
this theory, fit only for the somnambulist and the me-
dium. He came to adhere to a doctrine which counted 
on intangible things as well as on regiments, and which 
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hoped to achieve a victory of the «unconscious» in bat-
tle by making use of the vital élan of the troops: which 
élan was to be produced by the deep-rooted instinct of 
success. The office table of The General Staff on which 
was drawn up Plan No. 17 was, if I may say so, the sort 
of table which is «turned» by the pseudo-spiritualist.» 
[46, p. 33-34]), and more polite, but ultimately devas-
tating – from A. Einstein [10, p. 123]. Blaming Bergson 
in misleading French supreme command from the real-
ity of war – new weapons, new tactics, adequate evalu-
ation of the French and German forces, as it happened 
in the interwar period, successfully overshadowed 
the effectiveness of a priori approach in military plan-
ning which was not actually invented by H.Bergson. 
The tendency of usage of the method of seeking truth 
not in reality, but in the thoughts of a supreme com-
mand is surprisingly very popular way of thinking, no 
matter how tragic outcomes it was bringing. Thus, it 
is possible to reduce the favorite method of historians 
who look for documents, letters and information about 
personal contacts and to contend, that the French Plan 
XVII and the strategic decision making during the First 
World War reflects not the ideas of the exact person 
– H.Bergson – but a fundamental principle of a priori 
cognition, which seems to be safe in the medically 
clean philosophic laboratory of thought, but becomes 
inevitably deadly being realized on the battlefield.
Did France have any chances to adjust her strate-
gy to reality after the First World War? To answer this 
question we have to turn to overview of the dominating 
philosophies in interwar period. As it is possible to con-
clude from the study of the sources of that time, French 
returned to philosophy of R.Descartes, as a traditionally 
reliable symbol of solid, precise science.
Even during the pre-war dominance of H.Bergson, 
French intellectuals kept referring to the founder of the 
French Modern tradition of thought [9]. In the interwar 
period the French military thought turns from Bergso-
nian intuitivism to the Cartesian methodism [22, 36, 37, 
38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 54].
Inspiration becomes opposed to method, which, ac-
cording to Perrier De La Bâthie, is the only one way 
to victory: «Faut-il, quand il s’agit de guerre ou de 
combat, se fier uniquement à son bon sens? De grands 
capitaines l’ont dit. Napoléon lui-même l’a ecrit. Mais 
peut-on considérer comme des articles de loi ces affir-
mations? Il semble bieu qu’elles aient emprunté toute 
leur valeur aux circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont 
été émises. Elles n’ont rien d’un axiome. Car il y a bon 
sens et bon sens. On dit d’un homme médiocre et ef-
facé: il a du ban sens, comme on dit d’une jeune fille 
peu jolie et pas très intelligente: c’est une bonne fille. 
X ... est sérieux, sans grand relief; il parle peu et, par 
suite, dit peu de sottises; il ne travaille pas ... ; X ... a 
beaucoup de bon sens. «Le bon sens, a dit Descartes, 
est la chuse du monde la mieux partagée, car chacun 
pense en ètre si bien pourvu que ceux qui sont les plus 
difficiles à contenter en toute chose n’ont point cau-
lume d’en désirer plus qu’ils en ont.» Les armées ne 
manqueront donc jamais d’hommes de bon sens. Est-
ce à dire que ce bon sens suffira à leurs chefs et leur 
donnera d’intuition la solution immédiate cles prob-
lèmes complexes et variés que leur posera la guerre 
moderne? Il est permis d’en douter et de penser, encore 
avec Descartes, que «ce n’est pas assez d’avoir l’esprit 
bon, le principal est de l’appliquer bien». C’est-à-dire 
d’avoir une méthode.» [45, p. 29-30].
Could this «Cartesian turn» make French strategic 
culture more realistic? There were too little chances for 
that: Cartesian rationalism was opposed to empiricism 
as well. Descartes natural philosophy was outgrown, 
but it caused no effect to his followers – Cartesianism 
became a national philosophy of France, uncritically in-
herited and, if it possible to say, realized in the French 
defensive plans of 1930ies – as non-realistic, as the 
Plan XVII was.
In the conclusion, the logic of narrative obliges to 
raise more questions than it supposed to happen in this 
brief overview. Why French allowed poets, writers, phi-
losophers, journalists invade the professional military 
issues, like grand strategy, military planning, and build-
ing strategic doctrines? Why military professionals, be-
ing educated in Humanities, showed themselves unable 
to assess critically the extra-military factors, related to 
the domain of Humanities? Why military professionals, 
who must have empirical and realistic mindsets by the 
definition, represented the opposite qualities?
The case study of correlations between the French 
national philosophy and her strategic doctrines of the 
first part of the XX century can reveal some fundamen-
tal issues. The concept of «strategic culture», so fash-
ionable at the military conferences and in the papers 
and monographs, still remains obscured. Still no con-
crete links between extra-military domains and the sci-
ence of war were revealed.  It is easy to hear that «war 
is a clash of ideas», but this point easily leads to per-
sonal relations of creator of ideas and decision-makers. 
There is still no essential scholarship about «war as a 
clash of methods», i.e. why empiricists have more 
chances to win, especially when they face rational-
ists, who try to find the truth not in reality, but in their 
minds.
Philosophic laboratory started its work nearly three 
thousand years ago, and the strong and weak sides of a 
posteriori and a priori cognition were showed more or 
less plausibly. But the surface preparation of military 
officers in philosophy and ignorance of applied profes-
sions of philosophers still creates a strange situation, 
when military strategists unconsciously realize one of 
these two mindsets, being hardly unaware of their inter-
nal errors and disadvantages, and philosophers, whose 
business is «to make thoughts clearer» find themselves 
unfamiliar with factual demand on their competence in 
applied sciences.
Thus, looking for correlations between philosophic 
methodology of cognition and peculiarities of elabora-
tion of national strategic doctrines can actualize new in-
terdisciplinary realm – strategic epistemology.
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